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Abstract
The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In the-
ory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters fur-
ther if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The
present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the under-
lying social preferences. Our experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon
versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game) which
allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism, inequity aversion, and
reference dependent altruism. Most subjects are classified as reference-dependent al-
truists, around 10% are inequity averse. Subjects are egoistic when their payoff is
below their reference point, they become efficiency concerned when satisfied, and
the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent’s payoff. Finally,
we successfully test RDA out-of-sample on a number of distribution and bargaining
games from three seminal social preference experiments.
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1 Introduction
Decisions in executive boards, committees, and parliaments are mostly reached by major-
ity rule (Shenoy, 1980). Following Baron and Ferejohn (1989), such collective decision
making processes are modeled as a random-proposer bargaining game with indefinite time
horizon. In each round, a player is randomly recognized as proposer who makes a pro-
posal which all players then vote on. The proposal is implemented if a majority votes in
favor, otherwise a new round begins. This model is canonically used to study majority
bargaining, with applications ranging from estimating proposer power in the US Congress
(Knight, 2005) to modeling labor relations (Okada, 2011). Expected payoffs increase with
power (Snyder Jr et al., 2005) and representation (Knight, 2008), but are traded off to
instrumentally buy votes for pushing proposals through, e.g. in congressional elections
(Levitt and Snyder Jr, 1997). Fréchette et al. (2005a) showed that experimental results
resemble those of the field.
The drawback of the majority rule is made particularly obvious by the Baron-Ferejohn
game. Ex ante, each of the n players expects a share of 1/n of the surplus. The coalition
formateur needs only n/2 votes to organize a majority, and thus needs to trade only half the
surplus to organize a majority—keeping the rest to himself. Strikingly, Montero (2007)
showed that inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) further increases inequity. Given
that inequity is considered an undesirable outcome in many societies, it appears unclear
why groups continue to choose by majority rule. A possible explanation is that majority
voting does not actually generate as much inequity in practice. As experimental evidence
suggests, majority bargaining actually is reasonably equitable (Fréchette et al., 2005a,b,
2012; Montero et al., 2008; Drouvelis et al., 2010). This, however, is puzzling and raises
a simple but critical question: What motivates equity in majority bargaining?
We answer this question with a systematic analysis of motives in the majority bargain-
ing game, which is important to understand for welfare and policy analysis. For example,
Knight (2005) shows that proposal power in the US Congress translates to securing project
spending, and the preferences of the executive play a vital role in determining distributive
outcomes (McCarty, 2000). We offer an explanation of equitable behavior and outcomes in
the majority bargaining game. Ironically, the key to equity in this case seems to relate to ef-
ficiency concerns. More generally, our explanation extends the social preference theory of
reference dependent altruism (RDA). RDA is known to capture behavior in the seemingly
related yet strategically different demand bargaining game (Breitmoser and Tan, 2013),
and below, we also show that RDA allows to capture behavior in three-player dictator
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games (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006) and simple sequential
games (Charness and Rabin, 2002). Jointly, this evidence suggests that RDA may offer a
reliable approach for capturing behavior in multi-player bargaining, where seminal models
such as altruism and inequity aversion are known to struggle with capturing behavior.
RDA utilities solely depend on the players’ incomes, which are salient features in
majority bargaining. It is expressed via linear utility functions ui = xi +αx j of payoffs
(xi,x j) where the degree of altruism α depends on the relation of the payoff xi to the
reference point. The main idea is very simple: the degree of altruism is low if one’s
payoff is below the reference point and it is high otherwise. For example, one may be
egoistic if one’s payoff falls short of one’s reference point, and one may be efficiency
concerned otherwise. Like other reference dependence theories (e.g. Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
2007), Breitmoser and Tan (2013) assume that the ex ante expected payoff serves as a
reference point. In this paper, we also consider the co-player’s payoff as an alternative
reference point. This extension serves two purposes. First, many reference dependence
studies feature either type of reference point, ex ante expectation and co-player’s payoff.
We therefore describe the two motives with RDA and experimentally test their validity.
Second, the assumptions that the co-player’s payoff serves as a reference point and that
efficiency concerns operate “above” the reference point directly capture the interplay of
efficiency and equity concerns, as found for example by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in
distribution choices under random role assignment in three-player dictator games.
RDA is a prima facie plausible explanation of majority bargaining, because it mod-
els the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity found in majority bargaining. In majority
bargaining, inequality can arise through the acceptance of inequitable proposals, and inef-
ficiencies can arise from delay (Compte and Jehiel, 2010). The efficiency-equity tradeoff
is an important topic in public policy (Okun, 1975; Ng, 2000). On the one hand, purely
efficiency concerned proposers are indifferent with respect to the resulting allocation but
seek mainly to avoid delay or breakdown. Hence, they make generous proposals, which
we observe in experiments. However, experiments also show that proposers do not make
inequitable proposals to their own disadvantage. This suggests the existence of equity
concerns. On the other hand, inequity aversion cannot serve as the sole explanation of be-
havior. This is because purely inequity averse responders mainly fear the possibility that
(upon rejection) they might get nothing, implying that they are willing to accept highly
inequitable allocations as long as they are not left out. Instead, responders with both ef-
ficiency and equity concerns still fear the possibility of being left out, but they see the
possibility of being in future winning coalitions much more positively, being efficiency
3
concerned rather than feeling guilty in such coalitions. This raises their continuation util-
ities, and paradoxically again, such “conditionally efficiency” concerned responders are
more likely to reject inequitable proposals than purely inequity concerned ones, implying
that the proposer has to make equitable proposals.
The experimental outcomes we observe are indeed equitable. They are compatible
with RDA, but incompatible with self-interest and other forms of social preferences. Based
on our analysis, subjects behave egoistically below their reference points while they are,
indeed, efficiency concerned above the reference point. That is, subjects are concerned
with increasing their own payoff as long as the individual objective is not met, and are
instead concerned with increasing efficiency when the individual expectation is met. Pro-
posers make generous proposals whilst satisfying their reference point. Voters accept pro-
posals that disadvantage fellow voters in order to meet their reference points, or they reject
proposals that do not meet their reference point in hope of being proposer in the next round.
This yields a plausible description of behavior in parliaments and committees.
Depending on the reference point, RDA predicts equal splits either within the winning
coalition or within the grand coalition. This prediction explains our experimental obser-
vations very well. In a structural analysis that analyzes social preferences in conjunction
with bounded rationality (QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), we find that the prefer-
ence parameters are approximately as hypothesized. In a book chapter discussing future
research for QRE, Goeree et al. (2016) suggested applying QRE with the incorporation
of social preference parameters to explaining the unanimous experimental observation of
under-realized bargaining power in the Baron-Ferejohn game (p. 286). Our paper shows
that this is indeed true. In addition, we confirm the underlying assumption of stationary
strategies (Baron and Kalai, 1993; Eraslan, 2002).
Finally, we show that RDA similarly helps explain behavior in a number of related
distribution and bargaining games. Specifically, we re-analyze the collection of mini dic-
tator, ultimatum and trust games in Charness and Rabin (2002), and the collections of
three-player dictator games in Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2006). We compare the accuracy of RDA’s predictions with those of the leading existing
models, inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and charitable reciprocity (Charness
and Rabin, 2002). We find that RDA is substantially better at explaining behavior in these
classes of interactions than those models—out-of-sample. This reinforces the idea that the
simple and intuitive notion of reference dependent altruism captures behavior in multi-
person interactions and thus may indeed be a behavioral force in majority bargaining.
Section 2 presents the experimental design and predictions for various assumptions
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on preferences. Section 3 reports the results. Section 4 performs an out-of-sample analysis
of these theories and compares their performance. Section 5 concludes.
2 The experiment
2.1 Majority bargaining
Our experiment implements the majority bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
in two complementary ways: with indefinite horizon and with finite horizon. In each
game, three players, N = {1,2,3}, have to divide e 24 by majority decision. The smallest
currency unit is .01 Euro. Using C = 24, the set of feasible allocations is
X=
{
x ∈ R|N| | x≥ 0, ∑i∈N xi ≤C, ∀i ∈ N : 100xi ∈ N0
}
. (1)
The first game that we test is the random-proposer game with a continuation probability
of .95 after each round without agreement.
Game 1 (PB95). In each round, one player is recognized as proposer by a uniform draw
from N. This player chooses x∈X, and the other players vote on x. If one of them accepts,
then the players’ payoffs are x. Otherwise, a new round begins with probability δ = 0.95
and the payoffs are 0 with probability 1−δ= 0.05.
PB95 is outcome equivalent to the random-proposer game with infinite time horizon
and discount factor δ = 0.95 if the players are risk neutral. This game has a plethora of
subgame-perfect equilibria (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), akin to folk theorems in repeated
games, but analyses generally focus on equilibria in stationary strategies. Stationary strate-
gies are independent of proposals and votes in previous rounds, and as such they are the
least complex equilibrium strategies (Baron and Kalai, 1993) and imply uniqueness of ex
ante equilibrium payoffs (Eraslan, 2002).
Ex ante, prior to proposer recognition, every player expects a payoff of C/3 = 8 in
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). Thus, payoff-maximizing voters accept
any proposal that allocates them at least their “continuation payoff” δ8 = 7.60, which in
turn are the costs of buying a vote. Payoff-maximizing proposers buy one vote and allocate
the rest 16.40 = 24−7.60 to themselves. Along the equilibrium path, proposals thus have
the structure (16.4,7.6,0) and are accepted immediately.
The second game implemented in our experiment is a random-proposer game iden-
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tical to PB95 with the difference that it ends after one round, and if the first proposal is
not accepted then players are paid their continuation payoffs from PB95. Hence, “PB00”
is strategically equivalent to PB95 for payoff-maximizing players, but as shown below,
predictions differ if players have social preferences.
Game 2 (PB00). A player is recognized as proposer by a uniform draw from N. This
player chooses x ∈ X, and the other players vote on x. If one of them accepts, then the
players’ payoffs are x. Otherwise, the payoffs are 7.60 = δC/3 per player.
If players maximize expected payoffs, the set of SPEs of PB00 corresponds with the
set of SSPEs of PB95 in the sense that equal proposal and voting decisions are made.
The ex post payoff profile has the structure (16.4,7.6,0) in both games. PB00 relates
most closely to the three-player majority games by Diermeier and Gailmard (2006). They
experimentally analyze a one-round majority game with disagreement payoffs that were
asymmetric and either very low or very high. In particular, their disagreement payoffs are
of different magnitude than the continuation payoffs of PB95, whereas we equate these
payoffs. Their results complement ours in that they also find that inequity aversion does
not fit behavior. In relation to standard three-player ultimatum games, PB00 differs in that
the disagreement payoffs are positive and that acceptance of either player implements the
proposal for both players.
2.2 Social preferences
We consider the following models of social preferences: FS inequity aversion, CR reci-
procity, CES altruism, and reference dependent altruism (RDA).
UFSi (x) = xi−∑
j 6=i
α(x j− xi) · Ixi<x j +∑
j 6=i
β(x j− xi) · Ixi≥x j (2)
UCRi (x) = xi−∑
j 6=i
(α+θq j)(x j− xi) · Ixi<x j +∑
j 6=i
(β−θq j)(x j− xi) · Ixi≥x j (3)
UCESi (x) =
(
(1−α) · (1+ xi)β+ αn ∑ j 6=i(1+ x j)β
)
/β (4)
URDAi (x) = xi+∑
j 6=i
αx j · Ixi<x∗+∑
j 6=i
βx j · Ixi≥x∗ (5)
FS inequity aversion captures behavior in games with fixed roles, e.g. ultimatum and
trust games (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, 2010). Generally, it is assumed that envy (α) out-
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weighs guilt (β) and that guilt is bounded, i.e. 0 ≤ β < α and β < 1/(n− 1).1 Charness
and Rabin (2002) extend FS inequity aversion by introducing a reciprocal component with
weight θ. This component is switched on (q j = 1) if j previously “misbehaved” by making
a welfare-reducing decision, else q j = 0. CR reciprocity reduces to FS inequity aversion
for θ= 0. If θ> 0, CR-players tend to punish welfare-diminishing behavior of their oppo-
nents, as their altruism weights decrease after such “misbehavior”. CES utility functions
are used frequently in analyses of dictator and public goods games (Andreoni and Miller,
2002; Goeree et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007). The functional form in Eq. (4) follows
Cox et al. (2007) and is adopted for its numerical stability. Here, α measures the degree
of altruism, and 1/(1−β) is the elasticity of substitution.
RDA describes how altruism is high (low) if the payoff is at or above (below) the ref-
erence point x∗. Following previous work, we distinguish two kinds of reference points.
RDA with the absolute reference point defined by the ex ante expected payoff (following
e.g. Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2007) is abbreviated ARDA, and RDA with the relative reference
point defined by the opponent’s payoff (following e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is abbre-
viated RRDA. Intuitively, α < β < 1 holds, i.e. players reaching their reference point are
“content” and thus more willing to share.2 Critically, α < β implies that utilities exhibit
a jump discontinuity at the reference point, which models that players substantially enjoy
reaching their reference points. This mimics equity concerns in the case of RRDA. Fur-
ther, it implies that RDA players are willing to take risks to reach their reference points,
i.e. they are more likely to reject sub-par proposals.
Predictions for PB95 and PB00 diverge in opposite directions if players have social
preferences other than RDA. Figure 1 illustrates by plotting the ranges of equilibrium
proposals compatible with the four families of social preferences. This shows how the
joint analysis of PB95 and PB00 disentangles these theories. To understand the divergence
of predictions, let us first consider FS inequity aversion. Utilities are denoted as U(x,y,z),
where x is the payoff of the player in question, and y,z are the interchangeable payoffs of
his opponents. If guilt is limited as usual, β< 1/2= 1/(n−1), all proposers pay the value
y that is necessary to buy one vote and keep the rest to themselves. As a result, equilibrium
proposals have the structure (24− y,y,0), where y is the transfer necessary to buy a vote.
In equilibrium, the utility of the recipient of this transfer equates with his continuation
1Blanco et al. (2011) find that this assumption fits well on average, but in certain dictator games some
subjects appear to have β> 1. These subjects go beyond equalizing payoffs, in favor of the recipient, which
is not observed in our experiment on majority bargaining with 1:1 transfers.
2For ARDA-players, α < β implies that they are less altruistic toward all their opponents before their
payoffs meet their ex ante expectations. In contrast, α < β implies for RRDA-players that they are less
altruistic toward a specific opponent once their payoff falls below the payoff of that particular opponent.
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Figure 1: The ranges of proposals that are compatible with the preference theories
(Note that CR reciprocity is equivalent to FS inequity aversion here)
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Note: Displayed are the predicted proposals to the player whose vote is bought. We focus on α,β ≥ 0.1,
as all models degenerate to egoism for α,β ≈ 0. Specifically, CES altruism Eq. (4) for α ∈ [.1, .5] and
β ∈ [.1, .9], FS inequity aversion Eq. (2) or CR reciprocity Eq. (3) for α ∈ [.1,1] and β ∈ [.1, .33], absolute
reference dependence Eq. (5) for α ∈ [−.33, .33] and β ∈ [.16, .66], and relative reference dependence Eq.
(5) for α ∈ [.1, .33] and β ∈ [.44, .88]. Note that proposal range compatible with ARDA degenerates to a
point in stationary SPEs of PB95 for all β−α> 1/4.
utility, and assuming stationarity, and this yields the following equilibrium condition.3
PB95: U(y,C−y,0) = δ
3
(
U(C−y,y,0)+U(y,C−y,0)+U(0,C−y,y))+(1−δ)U(0,0,0)
In contrast, the equilibrium transfer in PB00 ensures that the player whose vote is bought
3A standard continuity argument implies that at least one voter accepts in case of indifference. Assume
there is an equilibrium where both voters reject in case of indifference. Then the proposer must offer y
such that U(y,C− y,0) > u˜, but there is no optimal y in this case, hence no equilibrium. In turn, it is clear
that there is an equilibrium where the voters accept in case of indifference, as unilateral deviations are not
profitable when one is indifferent.
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is indifferent between (y,C− y,0) and implementing the disagreement payoffs,
PB00: U(y,C− y,0) =U(δC/3,δC/3,δC/3).
These conditions have the same solution if players maximize payoffs, Ui(x) = xi. If
the utility is weakly concave (as in FS inequity aversion) or strictly concave (CES altru-
ism), then the continuation utility in PB95 is less than the disagreement utilities in PB00.
This simply obtains as ex post payoffs are inequitable in PB95 and equitable in PB00, with
the latter being the mean of the former. In conjunction with concave utilities, this yields
said relation,4 and since continuation utilities of all players are lower, the costs of vote
buying are smaller in PB95 than in PB00. Solving the above conditions for y yields the
following equilibrium transfers under FS inequity aversion.
y95 =C · 3α+δ(1−2β−2α)3+6α−3β−2δ · (α+β) y00 =C ·
δ/3+α
1+2α−β .
This implies y95 < 7.60 = δC/3 and y00 > 7.60 = δC/3 under the standard assumptions
(0 < β < α with β < 1/2 if n = 3). Inequity averse players make less equitable transfers
than payoff maximizers in PB95 and more equitable transfers than payoff maximizers in
PB00 (Montero, 2007, discusses the former in detail). This holds similarly for all util-
ity functions U that are weakly concave in the payoff profile, such as CES altruism, but
the predictions of FS inequity aversion and CES altruism differ quantitatively, as Figure
1 shows. Further, assuming proposers waste no part of the surplus, they do not “misbe-
have” as defined by Charness and Rabin (2002). Thus, negative reciprocity is irrelevant,
rendering the theories of FS inequity aversion and CR reciprocity behaviorally equivalent
in majority bargaining. That is, FS inequity aversion and CR reciprocity predict equiv-
alent behavior along the path of play, and in agreement with CES altruism, they predict
inequitable transfers in PB95.
In contrast, RRDA and ARDA predict equitable transfers in both PB95 and PB00.
RDA induces a utility jump at the reference point which in turn breaks the weak concavity.
Proposers have the bargaining power to make proposals that satisfy their reference points,
in which case they enjoy a utility jump, and can thus behave generously at the same time.
Conversely, voters reject proposals that do not meet their reference point, and would prefer
4To see this, consider a two-player game with (a) ex post payoffs (x1,x2) and (x2,x1) with 0.5 probability
each and (b) alternatively y= (x1+x2)/2 with certainty. For any concave utility function, expected utility in
the former case is less than the (expected) utility in the latter case. The above simply extends this observation
to three players.
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to gamble on the chance of being recognized as proposer in the next round. Thus, RDA
players require larger compensation from proposals than egoistic players. On the one
hand, under RRDA, the voters require a comparably large compensation as long as the
proposer gets more than them. Solving the above equilibrium conditions for y yields
y95 =
(δ(1+2α)−3α)C
(α−β) δ+3(1−α) y00 =
(δ(1+2β)−3α)C
3 (1−α) , (6)
assuming β< 1. Thus, both y00 and y95 are greater than δC/3 under RRDA, for all β> α.
This prediction differs qualitatively from the predictions of the weakly concave utilities
discussed above, and it is compatible with the equitable proposals observed by Fréchette
et al. (2005a,b). Further, as the emotional bonus β−α of reaching the reference point
increases, the vote buying costs y increase further, up to y = 12 in PB00.
On the other hand, under ARDA, players accept any proposal that allocates them at
least their ex ante expectation (for a very wide range of parameter constellations). If β−α
is not too small, they reject any other proposal and the equilibrium proposal is y = 8 in
PB95. The result is similar in PB00, where the equilibrium proposal can be shown to
satisfy 7.6 < y < 8 for a wide range of parameters, e.g. for all δ < 1 and α < 0. Thus,
ARDA predicts proposals close to y = 8 in both games, as shown in Figure 1.
In light of the conditional efficiency concerns observed by Charness and Rabin (2002)
and Engelmann and Strobel (2004), we hypothesize that RDA players are largely egoistic
below their reference point (α≈ 0) and largely efficiency concerned above their reference
point (β ≈ 1). In these extreme cases, ARDA players are indifferent between all (24−
y,y,0) with y ∈ [8,16]; their average proposals are therefore (12+ε,12−ε,0) if β is close
to 1. This predicts roughly equal splits within the winning coalition. RRDA players
converge to (8,8,8) in the limit,5 i.e. equal splits within the grand coalition.
2.3 Experimental logistics
The experiment was conducted in the experimental economics laboratory at the Europa
Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. The experiment was, apart from the
experimental instructions and control questionnaire, fully computerized (using z-Tree, see
Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from various faculties of the university. An
announcement for this experiment was sent to recipients on an email database of potential
5To be precise, in the limit, RRDA players are indifferent between all allocations giving them at least
as much as each opponent. However, they maximize the probability of acceptance by donating equitably
(pleasing both opponents under RRDA) if there is infinitesimal noise (e.g. logistic voting).
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subjects. Those who responded to the email were recruited accordingly.
We conducted a total of nine sessions: five sessions of PB95 and four sessions of
PB00. The between-subject design prevents carryover effects across these two types of
games. Each session had 12 subjects. A total of 108 subjects participated. Each subject
was allowed to participate only once. Each session was partitioned into two sub-sessions,
to each six subjects were randomly assigned. Subjects never interacted with those from
other sub-sessions. We partitioned the sessions to increase the number of independent
observations, and ran sub-sessions simultaneously to enhance the sense of anonymity.
The subjects’ tasks and information conform precisely to the definitions of the two
games provided above. Subjects were matched into groups of three and stayed in the same
groups during each game. Each PB95 game progressed in “rounds”, while each PB00
game had one round. Subjects were randomly assigned their roles (proposer or voter) at
the beginning of each round. During each round, voters were informed of the proposals
made. At the end of each round, subjects were informed of the outcomes of that round. At
the end of each game, subjects were informed of the outcomes of that game. This follows
the way the games are theoretically defined.
In the experiment, each subject played 10 games. Repetition allows for experience
and learning. To implement the one-shot context, we randomly rematched subjects after
each game to eliminate reputational and reciprocal effects across games. This method was
first proposed by Andreoni (1988), and has been adopted as standard practice in economics
experiments since. By running sub-sessions simultaneously, we reduced the perceived
probability of being rematched with the same co-players. With 12 subjects per session,
the perceived probability of being rematched with a given co-player in the next round was
p= 2/11 and that of being rematched in the same group was p < 0.04. Subjects could not
attribute others’ actions and outcomes from previous games to specific individuals as 1)
groups were randomly rematched for each game, 2) subjects’ identities were kept anony-
mous, and 3) roles were randomly reallocated. Direct reciprocity was thus impossible.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned computer ter-
minals. They started by reading the experimental instructions, provided on printed sheets,
followed by answering a short control questionnaire that allowed us to check their under-
standing. Neutral language was used throughout the experiment (e.g. “A-participant” and
“B-participant” instead of “proposer” and “voter”, and “stage” instead of “game”). The
instructions used in PB95 sessions are provided as supplementary material. Subjects in
doubt were verbally advised by the experimental assistants before being allowed to begin.
Each computer terminal was partitioned, so that subjects were unable to communicate via
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audio or visual signals, or to look at other computer screens. Decisions were thus made
in privacy. At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed of their payments, and
asked to privately choose a codename and password. This was used to anonymously col-
lect their payments from an independent third party not involved in running or planning
the experiment in the week after the experiment. This procedure enhanced subject privacy.
Each subject was given a e 4 participation fee and the earnings from one randomly chosen
game. The marginal incentives could therefore range from e 0 to e 24 per subject. The
average payout was above e 11 per subject for, on average, less than 1 hour per session.6
3 Results
3.1 Behavioral patterns
In this section, we analyze the qualitative compatibility of the experimental observations
with the predictions of the different theories. Proposals are denoted as (xp,xh,xl), where
xp is the proposer’s payoff, xh := max{x1,x2} is the higher of the voters’ payoffs, and
xl =min{x1,x2} is the lower of the voters’ payoffs. Table 1 shows that the average payoffs
of voters exceed the SSPE predictions for egoistic players, xh = 7.6 and xl = 0. The
average payoffs are (xp,xh,xl) = (10.62,8.60,4.15) for PB95 and (10.23,8.84,4.19) for
PB00. Mann-Whitney U tests taking the average of each sub-session as an independent
observation show that the proposal components xp, xh, and xl are not significantly different
between PB95 and PB00 (p= 0.633 for xp, p= 0.696 for xh, p= 0.965 for xl). This holds
robustly in both the first and the second half of the experiment. In this respect, the results
are compatible with RRDA and ARDA, which predict that outcomes are equitable and
similarly so in PB95 and PB00. In turn, they are not compatible with CES altruism, and
FS inequity aversion or CR reciprocity, which predict xh < 7.6 in PB95 and xh > 7.6 in
PB00.7
Figure 2 plots the distributions of proposals and voting behavior in PB95 and PB00.
Figure 2a plots the distributions of proposals made to each of the two voters. These dis-
tributions are plotted in relation to the empirical continuation payoffs, which are 7.36 in
PB95 and 7.60 in PB00. The plots include the proposals that were not accepted, which are
6The monetary incentives provided in our experiment are substantial by local standards. Our mean
payment of above e 11 per hour is, for example, 50% more than the mean wage of a research assistant.
7Regression analyses of player-specific payoffs controlling for game (for both treatments) and round (for
PB95) confirm the above, and also show that stationarity and truncation consistency are not violated. The
details are provided as supplementary material.
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Table 1: Means (and standard errors) of the proposals for first and second halves of the
experiment
Proposer payoff xp Higher payoff xh Lower payoff xl
G 1–5 G 6–10 G 1–5 G 6–10 G 1–5 G 6–10
PB95 10.266
(0.5465)
10.992
(0.6411)
8.365
(0.3369)
8.911
(0.3976)
4.676
(0.5542)
3.548
(0.5554)
PB00 9.57
(0.7255)
10.899
(0.531)
8.273
(0.5503)
9.403
(0.3458)
4.887
(0.6133)
3.484
(0.6421)
Note: The standard errors are computed using the sub-session means as independent observa-
tions. The values for “G 1–5” refer to the first five games per session, those for “G 6–10” refer
to the last five games per session.
Figure 2: The distribution of proposals and the voting decisions
(a) Proposals in relation to the (empirical) continuation payoffs in PB00 and PB95
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Note: The empirical estimate of expected payoff in PB00 is 7.88, and the estimated discounted payoff
(continuation payoff) in PB95 is 7.36. The points are slightly perturbed to visualize their clustering.
(b) Voting functions (relative acceptance frequencies)
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located mostly in the lower-left quadrant. The vast majority of proposals is in the other
three quadrants, where at least one voter’s continuation payoff is met. These proposals
had mostly been accepted; Figure 2b shows that offering at least one opponent a payoff
of 8 ensures acceptance with high probability. We can see in Figure 2a that the proposals
in both treatments are located roughly along a concave frontier stretching from around
(xh,xl) = (10,0) through (8,8) to (0,10). The distributions have three mass points. In
PB95, around 30 proposals are at (12,0) or (0,12), and another 30 proposals are at (8,8).
In PB00, the mass points at (12,0) and (0,12) are less populated. Figure 2a shows that
further observations are clustered near these mass points: there is a cluster of proposals
allocating 9–12 to one opponent and zero or negligible amounts to the other one and a
second area to the southwest of (8,8).
These cluster areas fit the predictions of RDA. On the one hand, ARDA predicts pro-
posals of the form (12+ε,12−ε,0) if β is close 1. ARDA is thus qualitatively compatible
with the observations around (xh,xl) = (10,0) in Figure 2a, if we allow β to be slightly be-
low 1. RRDA is compatible with the observations around (xh,xl) = (8,8), suggesting that
their β is indeed close to 1. Further, almost all observations near (8,8) in Figure 2a are to
its southwest, i.e. the proposer gets at least as much as the voters in all cases. This strong
relational effect uniquely fits RRDA, as it is the only model predicting that proposer utility
drops substantially if they get less than the voters. In either case, the voters theoretically
accept proposals if y ≈ 8, which is also empirically satisfied (Figure 2b). As discussed
above, and by Montero (2007), these observations are incompatible with weakly concave
utility functions.
3.2 Modeling motives
In this section, we econometrically verify the qualitative observations made above. We
estimate the utility functions using a structural model of behavior, quantal response equi-
librium (QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), and evaluate their adequacy in relation to
the data. QRE relaxes the assumption of “best responses” toward “better responses”, i.e.
that players do not solely choose best responses. Still, the more profitable an option is, the
higher is its choice probability. Specifically, we model PB00-choices as agent logit equi-
libria (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) and PB95-choices as stationary logit equilibria (Bre-
itmoser et al., 2010), which we jointly abbreviate as SLE. Due to the large strategy sets,8
8Our analysis uses a smallest currency unit of e 0.2, and given the cake sizes of e 24, this implies that
the number of possible proposals is on the order of 106 in each round.
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we will also consider a generalization called stationary nested logit equilibrium (SNLE).
Nested logit (McFadden, 1978, 1984) allows for the possibility that subjects choose pro-
posals in multiple decision steps. The clustering displayed in Figure 2a suggests that this
is a possibility, and in particular it suggests that subjects first determine how many oppo-
nents and whom they pay their continuation payoffs (to buy the vote) before they choose
the actual allocation. In order to be on the save side, we control for this possibility, but
the qualitative results do not depend on the adopted choice model. The technical details of
nested logit in stationary equilibria are provided in the supplementary material.
The clustered observations discussed in the previous section suggest a subject pool
with two discrete components. We model subject heterogeneity of this discrete nature
using finite mixture models (McLachlan and Peel, 2000). This allows us to simultaneously
estimate number, weights, and utility as well as choice parameters of subject types. To
define the likelihood function, let K denote the set of components in the population with
weights νk and behavioral parameter tuple pk for all k ∈ K. Thus with P= (pk)k∈K as the
behavioral parameter profile, and with O= (os,t) as the set of observations for all subjects
s ∈ S and periods t ∈ T , the log-likelihood is
LL(P|O) =∑
s∈S
ln∑
k∈K
νk L(s,k) with L(s,k) =∏
t∈T
σ
(
os,t |pk
)
, (7)
using σ
(
os,t |pk
)
as the probability of action os,t according to the QRE defined by the pa-
rameter profile pk. The log-likelihood is maximized jointly over all parameters to obtain
consistent and efficient estimates (see e.g. Amemiya, 1978, and Arcidiacono and Jones,
2003, for further discussion), and to allow us to extract standard errors from the infor-
mation matrix.9 We evaluate the significance of differences between models using stan-
dard likelihood-ratio tests (Vuong, 1989), nested or non-nested as required, applied to the
standard information criterion ICL-BIC for finite mixture models (Biernacki et al., 1999,
2000).10
9We use the derivative-free NEWUOA algorithm (Powell, 2008) for the initial approach toward the max-
imum (NEWUOA is a comparably efficient and robust algorithm, see Auger et al., 2009, and Moré and Wild,
2009), and subsequently, we use a Newton-Raphson algorithm to ensure local convergence. This procedure
has been repeated using a variety of starting values. The complete list of parameter estimates is provided as
supplementary material.
10 ICL-BIC is comparable to the well-known Bayes information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) but
additionally penalizes mixture models with superfluous components. This resolves the issue that BIC
overestimates the number of components (“subject types”) of finite mixture models. BIC is defined
as BIC = −LL + d/2 · log(O) with number of parameters d and number of observations O (Schwarz,
1978). The integrated classification likelihood-BIC to be used for mixture models is defined as ICL-BIC =
−LL+d/2 · lnO+En(τˆ) using the entropy En(τˆ) =−∑s∈S∑k∈K τˆsk ln τˆsk of posterior component member-
ship, where τˆsk =
νk L(s,k)
∑k′∈K νk′ L(s,k′)
. For discussion, see Biernacki et al. (1999, 2000).
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Table 2: Robustness checks of the identified motives
(a) Goodness-of-fit (ICL-BIC) of logit (SLE) vs. nested logit (SNLE)
Number of components (“subject types”)
Utility function SLE × 1 SNLE × 1 SNLE × 2 SNLE × 3
CES Altr 4513.13 ≪ 3992.96 ≪ 3890.92 ≪ 3702.54
IneqAv 4570.67 ≪ 3835.85 ≪ 3700.56 ≪ 3666.14
RRDA 4131.97 ≪ 3668.32 ≪ 3469.22 = 3486.81
ARDA 4344.01 ≪ 3621.68 ≪ 3488.86 = 3512.42
Note: Goodness-of-fit if we allow for up to three types of subjects with either CES altruism Eq. (4), inequity
aversion Eq. (2), or reference dependent altruism Eq. (5). We distinguish stationary logit and nested logit
equilibria, SLE and SNLE, respectively, where the multiplier denotes the number of subject types being
distinguished. The parameter estimates are supplementary material.
(b) Goodness-of-fit (ICL-BIC) of mixture models with two differing motives
Second component
First component CES Altr IneqAv RRDA ARDA
CES Altr 3890.93  3730.59  3591.86 = 3607.17
IneqAv 3730.81 = 3701.2 ≪ 3534.5 = 3524.85
RRDA 3591.48 = 3534.87  3469.22 < 3415.11
ARDA 3607.18 < 3524.8  3415.11 > 3488.85
(c) Goodness-of-fit (ICL-BIC) of mixture models with three different components
Third component
First two components CES Altr IneqAv RRDA ARDA
CES + IneqAv 3744.59 = 3750.76 ≪ 3513.81 = 3533.84
CES + RRDA 3500.23 = 3513.52 = 3531.01 ≪ 3423.75
Ineq + ARDA 3533.81 = 3517.12 ≪ 3404.32 ≫ 3537
RRDA + ARDA 3423.74 = 3405.07 = 3422.73 = 3437.96
Note: Tables (b)–(d) display the ICL-BIC criteria of model fit, Fn. (10), and the results of nested/non-
nested Vuong tests on ICL-BIC for adjacent models (following the suggestion of (Vuong, 1989, Eq. 5.9), we
perform likelihood ratio tests including the BIC correction term and the model entropy En(τˆ)). The signs
“<,,≪” indicate significant improvements at α = .1, .01, .001, respectively (note that “less is better” if
goodness-of-fit is measured by information criteria such as ICL-BIC).
Tables 2a–2c summarize the results of the structural analysis. The underlying param-
eter estimates are provided as supplementary material. First, we verify whether choice
is captured by a one-step logit process or by the two-step nested logit process described
above. The results are given in columns “SLE × 1” and “SNLE × 1” of Table 2a, respec-
tively, and rather strongly show that for all utility functions, model adequacy improves
by about 500 points on the log-likelihood scale if we allow for the two-step “hierarchi-
cal” choice process where subjects first pick whom to pay the continuation payoff. That
is, choice violates IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) highly significantly, but
notably, the best-fitting utility functions are ARDA and RRDA in either case. Table 2a
also informs on the necessity to distinguish multiple components (or, subject types) as-
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suming all components are either CES, FS, ARDA, or RRDA. Regardless of the utility
function assumed, at least two components are to be distinguished in the population (com-
pare columns “SNLE × 1” and “SNLE × 2”), but again, ARDA and RRDA are most
adequate in either case.
Secondly, given that at least two components are to be distinguished, we determine
the most adequate two-component model by evaluating all possible combinations. Ta-
ble 2b reports the results. It shows that regardless how the first component is modeled,
comparing columns “CES Altr” and “IneqAv” across all rows, a second component with
FS inequity aversion fits better than CES. Next, RRDA fits significantly better than FS
inequity aversion across rows, comparing columns “IneqAv” and “RRDA”, and the dif-
ferences amount to more than 100 points on the log-likelihood scale (or, p < 0.01) in all
cases. Thus, at least one component is estimated to be RRDA or ARDA. Using either
of ARDA and RRDA as first component, we find that one complements the other best,
and the differences to the alternative combinations are highly substantial in terms of ICL-
BIC—again at least 100 points on the log-likelihood scale. This strongly confirms our
qualitative observations made above, that behavior aligns with ARDA and RRDA but not
with FS inequity aversion and CES altruism.
Thirdly, Table 2c determines the structure of a possible third component (however
small), i.e. the composition of a third subject type potentially differing from ARDA and
RRDA. To provide the general picture, we estimate 16 three-component models. All mix-
tures not including both RRDA and ARDA components have ICL-BIC values above 3500
points, and thus must be considered inadequate again. The best-fitting three-component
model, and indeed the only model that improves upon the pure RRDA + ARDA mixture
in terms of ICL-BIC, identifies a third component of subjects with FS inequity aversion.
The parameter estimates (Table 3) show that the previously identified RRDA component
is split up into two components, into one of RRDA and one of FS inequity aversion. The
share of FS subjects is significant in relation to its standard error and in Vuong likelihood-
ratio tests (p < .01), but overall it is small (7.2%).11
Table 3 provides the detailed parameter estimates and standard errors of the most ad-
equate models. If we distinguish the two components identified based on Table 2b, 55%
of the subjects have RRDA preferences and 45% of them have ARDA preferences. The
rather balanced distribution of RRDA and ARDA types corresponds with the previous
observations that the two cluster areas contain similar numbers of observations. As indi-
cated, the RRDA component can be further split down into a sub-component with RRDA
11Since the third component is already very small, estimation of a possible fourth component is skipped.
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Table 3: The estimation results
Component Weight λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β ICL/LL/R2
RRDA 0.552
(−)
5.542
(0.093)
0.145
(0.004)
0.101
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.27
(0.002)
0.998
(0.007)
ARDA 0.448
(0.054)
3.332
(0.042)
0.119
(0)
0.088
(0)
0.317
(0.002)
0.334
(0)
0.795
(0.006)
3415.11
−3346.74
0.8914
RRDA 0.481
(−)
5.653
(0.027)
0.127
(0.001)
0.094
(0)
0
(0)
0.277
(0.002)
0.996
(0)
ARDA 0.447
(0.055)
4.604
(0.029)
0.148
(0)
0.024
(0.001)
0.328
(0.002)
0.36
(0)
0.732
(0.003)
IneqAv 0.072
(0.023)
0.894
(0.011)
0.157
(0.006)
0.011
(0.003)
0.498
(0.01)
0.004
(0)
0.056
(0.001)
3405.07
−3306.89
0.8958
Note: (α,β) are the parameters of the four utility functions, the remaining parameters are the choice pa-
rameters discussed in the supplementary material. The standard errors are provided in parentheses. The
Cox-Snell Pseudo-R2 is R2 = 1− (L(MBaseline)/L(MFull))2/O, with the “baseline model” being the bench-
mark that players randomize uniformly in all cases and O being the number of observations.
preferences (48.1%) and a sub-component with FS inequity aversion containing 7.2% of
the subjects, but overall the share of FS inequity averse subjects is small. The estimated
RRDA and ARDA parameters also correspond with the observations made in the previous
section. The RRDA component has β ≈ 1, which means that RRDA players are approx-
imately welfare-concerned as long as they get at least as much as their opponents. This
explains the cluster around (xh,xl) = (8,8). The ARDA players have a large difference
β−α and β slightly below 1, which explains the cluster around (xh,xl) = (10,0).
4 Predicting behavior in other games
In this section, we evaluate the adequacy of RDA in relation to existing theories in out-
of-sample tests. We use data sets from seminal papers that relate closely to multi-player
bargaining: the “simple tests” of Charness and Rabin (2002, CR02), which comprise mini
dictator, ultimatum and trust games, the three-player dictator games analyzed by Engel-
mann and Strobel (2004, ES04) to illustrate the limits of inequity aversion as a general
behavioral principle, and the three-player voting games analyzed by Bolton and Ocken-
fels (2006, BO06) in response to illustrate the limits of efficiency concerns. Clearly, any
such test may only be indicative of RDA’s general adequacy, although out-of-sample, but
the above experiments have been designed to constitute tough tests of social preference
theory, they insightfully highlight behaviors which current models struggle to explain, and
all these experiments intuitively relate to multi-person bargaining problems. We there-
fore believe that these data sets constitute a test bed for RDA that is both challenging and
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informative, in particular considering that we strictly focus on out-of-sample tests.
The “simple distribution experiments” of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) consist of
11 three-person dictator games of three types: taxation games, envy games, and rich-
poor games. Taxation games were designed to compare the relevance of two theories of
inequity aversion, namely ERC (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and FS, while allowing for
efficiency concerns and maximin preferences as modeled by Charness and Rabin (2002).
Dictators choose between three allocations, one which is predicted by ERC and another
by FS inequity aversion—in half of the games efficiency or maximin predicts the same as
ERC and in the other half efficiency or maximin predicts the same as FS inequity aversion.
“Envy games” further test the robustness of efficiency concerns by having dictators choose
between inequitable but efficient allocations versus equitable but inefficient allocations, as
do “rich-poor games” which additionally are neutral to maximin preferences.
In the three-person “voting games” of Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), allocations are
determined by majority vote. There are two treatments: in the “straight mode”, subjects
knew their roles prior to voting, and in the “equal opportunity mode”, one’s actual role
was unknown prior to voting and there was an equal chance of being allocated to each
role (but votes are conditional on one’s eventual allocation). Each player chooses between
an equitable allocation (13,13,13) versus an efficient allocation (19,13,13) in Game I,
(27,1,17) in Game II, or (27,9,9) in Game III. Relative to individual payoffs under the
equitable allocation, the efficient allocation entails personal losses to none, majority, and
minority of the players in Games I, II and III, respectively. Personal losses are larger in
Game II than in Game III. These voting games analyze the tradeoff between equity and
efficiency.
The “simple tests” of Charness and Rabin (2002) consist of 32 games: dictator games
with two or three persons, and sequential-move response games with two or three persons.
In response games, the first mover chooses whether to stop the game or to let the second
mover choose. The second mover’s payoffs are identical across choices in some games,
and in others the second mover’s sacrifice helps or hurts the first mover.12 In addition to
tests of distributional and welfare concerns, response games allow for tests of reciprocity.
For each model, we determine predictions for each of the games and each of the roles.
We refer to models allowing for heterogeneous subject pools as “heterogeneous models”
and to models assuming homogeneous subject pools as “homogeneous models”. Besides
RDA, which is a heterogeneous model, we also report predictions based on ARDA or
12There were two games where the dictator’s payoffs were unknown, and so are not analyzed here.
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RRDA separately of each other, which thus are homogeneous models. Throughout, we
stick with the parameter estimates obtained above, see Table 3, and we use “RDA” to refer
to the 55-45 mixture of RRDA and ARDA estimated above.13
In addition to predictions based on egoism (“Ego”) and FS inequity aversion (“In-
eqAv”), we also test a heterogeneous model that considers both types of subjects. This
follows Fehr and Schmidt (2010), who postulate that the subject pool consists of 60%
egoists and 40% inequity averse types, which have α = 2/(n− 1) and β = 0.6/(n− 1)
in Eq. (2). We refer to this heterogeneous model as “FS-Full”. In Charness and Rabin
(2002, Table VI), one of the best-fitting models and its respective parameters estimated
is their full reciprocity model (“CR-Full”) with α = −.023,β = .424,θ = −.111 in Eq.
(3). Its predictions are partially in-sample and pose a rather tough challenge for RDA’s
out-of-sample predictions. We also test predictions for CR02’s reciprocal charity “Rec-
Char” model, which nullifies envy by setting α = 0. CR02’s estimates for RecChar are
α= 0,β= .425,θ=−.089, and its predictions are identical to CR-Full’s in many games.
For all models and all games, we derive the unique predictions without noise and eval-
uate their adequacy using the quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998; Gneiting and Raferty,
2007).14 With G as the set of games considered here, A(g) as the action set in game g ∈G,
n(a,g) as the number of subjects that chose a in g, and p(a,g) as the predicted probability
of a in g, the prediction scores are
Quadratic Score: SQ =−∑
g∈G
∑
a∈A(g)
∑
b∈A(g)
n(a,g) · (Ia=b− p(b,g))2. (8)
Table 4 contains the overall scores, the scores for subsets of games, and in parentheses
bootstrapped p-values of tests of differences to RDA (if p < .1, then the respective model
fits significantly worse than RDA). The appendix contains the predictions of all models
for all games. The main results are clear-cut and systematic across data sets. First, the
heterogeneous models (RDA and FS-Full) fit better than all homogeneous models, but
only RDA does so significantly. Second, RDA also fits better than the heterogeneous
13The predictions are invariant to the set of parameter estimates chosen from Table 3, which are esti-
mated either with or without an additional component of inequity aversion. Reference points for ARDA
are, consistent with the definition given after Eq. (5) and with the random role allocation feature of both
experimental designs, the ex ante expectations prior to random role allocation, i.e. the equilibrium payoff of
payoff-maximizing players averaged across roles.
14We evaluate the predictions without noise, as noise parameters such as those estimated above or by
Charness and Rabin are not transferable across experiments. In case a model’s prediction is indeterminate,
we refine it in the sense of the respective theories. The Ego prediction is refined toward inequity aversion in
cases of indeterminacy.
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Table 4: Out-of-sample fit of social preference models models (negative Quadratic scores,
i.e. more is better), with p-values of significance in relation to RDA
Utility models
Ego ARDA RRDA RecChar CR-Full IneqAv RDA FS-Full RDA-Ego
Dictator Games ES04 −440.02
(0)
−317.68
(0)
−321.76
(0)
−361.78
(0.041)
−361.78
(0.041)
−488.02
(0)
−286.3
(−)
−444.84
(0)
−306.36
(0.353)
Voting Games BO06 −192.48
(0.072)
−195.36
(0.079)
−228
(0.009)
−192.48
(0.066)
−158.88
(0.39)
−228
(0.006)
−153.91
(−1)
−183.65
(0.152)
−183.65
(0.158)
Dictator Games CR02 −206
(0)
−190.48
(0)
−185.76
(0)
−166
(0)
−166
(0)
−293.6
(0)
−157.19
(−)
−197.84
(0.008)
−187.34
(0)
Response Games CR02, Pl. 1 −518.24
(0.344)
−672.4
(0.002)
−541.28
(0.099)
−480.4
(0.506)
−544.4
(0.249)
−652.16
(0.006)
−483.96
(−)
−380.77
(0.909)
−354.66
(0.976)
Response Games CR02, Pl. 2 −464.3
(0.015)
−516.46
(0.008)
−428.46
(0.042)
−627.42
(0)
−627.42
(0)
−547.9
(0.004)
−343.32
(−)
−416.14
(0.117)
−434.6
(0.031)
Overall −1821.04
(0)
−1892.38
(0)
−1705.26
(0)
−1828.08
(0)
−1858.48
(0)
−2209.68
(0)
−1424.69
(−1)
−1623.23
(0.056)
−1466.62
(0.356)
Note: Data sets are abbreviated as above: CR02 is Charness and Rabin (2002), ES04 is Engelmann and Strobel (2004), BO06 is Bolton and Ockenfels
(2006). Below the Quadratic Scores, the p-values of tests of H0 : Score (Model)≤ Score (RDA) (obtained by bootstrapping, with 50.000 resamples,
using the scores of the various games as independent observations). The model abbreviations are as above, see e.g. Eq. (8). “RDA-Ego” is a mixture
of 60% Egoists and 40% RRDA, as a benchmark for the respective FS mixture.
Fehr-Schmidt model FS-Full. It improves on FS-Full in four of the five classes of games,
which we discuss in more detail shortly. The best-fitting homogeneous model is RRDA,
and quite surprisingly, it is the only model that improves upon Ego in this out-of-sample
test. As a homogeneous model, ARDA does not fit as well, but it complements RRDA
well, as the RRDA-ARDA mixture fits significantly better than RRDA overall.
Across the three sets of dictator and voting games, ARDA, RRDA, and the two recip-
rocal charity models fit about similarly well. Inequity aversion does substantially worse
than these models in these dictator games. As for CR02’s response games, ARDA and
RRDA predict player 2’s behavior rather well, while their predictions for player 1 are
rather weak. The strength of RDA, and in particular of RRDA, is therefore to explain
both behavior in generalized dictator games and the choices of player 2 in CR02’s re-
sponse games. This set of decisions comprises distributional choices, with and without
“contexts” such as a previous choice of a co-player. For this reason, we conclude that the
“context dependence” of distributional choice appears to be captured comparably well by
reference dependence of altruism.
The strength of charitable reciprocity and inequity aversion, in turn, is to explain the
behavior of player 1 in CR02’s response games. These choices appear to be characterized
by strategic or instrumental reciprocity in the sense of Blanco et al. (2011) and Cabral et al.
(2014). Table 3 shows that egoism also does fairly well in predicting the choices of player
1, and the only homogeneous model improving upon egoism in predicting strategic reci-
procity is the reciprocal charity model of Charness and Rabin. Amongst the heterogeneous
models, FS-Full captures strategic reciprocity particularly well. It appears that this is to be
attributed to its inclusion of egoism. To verify this, we estimated an “RDA-Ego” mixture
of 60% Egoists and 40% RRDA, i.e. a mixture that substitutes FS inequity aversion (In-
eqAv) with RRDA. This model fits substantially better than FS-Full, with respect to player
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1 in response games, although the RRDA-ARDA mixture we estimated above does not.
These results suggest that distributional choice and strategic reciprocity are governed by
different preference systems for a substantial number of players, confirming Blanco et al.
(2011) and Cabral et al. (2014).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally analyzed bargaining under majority voting. The theoreti-
cal prediction that majority voting strongly favors the coalition formateur holds under both
payoff maximization and weakly concave utilities such as FS inequity aversion and CES
altruism. This renders majority rule theoretically unsuitable for facilitating equitably out-
comes, but previous experimental results suggest the contrary. The observed equity also
resembles similar outcomes in the field (Fréchette et al., 2005a). To ascertain its suitability
and allow development for practical use, underlying preferences need be understood.
We theoretically demonstrated how reference dependent altruism (RDA) potentially
explains majority bargaining behavior as observed in earlier experiments and the field.
Players are largely payoff concerned when their payoff is below their reference point and
largely efficiency concerned when their payoff is at or above their reference point. RDA
also is simple in that players are primarily payoff concerned and goal oriented, choosing
to benefit other players only if their personal goal is reached.
We set up a laboratory experiment with two treatments that, when analyzed in con-
junction, sharply separate existing theories and RDA for two kinds of reference points.
Thus, we were able to explicitly test whether RDA correctly predicts behavior in major-
ity bargaining. The observed votes and cluster areas of proposals are captured by RDA
in a manner that appears to be both qualitatively accurate and quantitatively fitting, with
pseudo-R2 around 90%. Thus, RDA is capable of capturing behavior in majority bar-
gaining. More generally, RDA appears to be a promising theory of behavior in random-
proposer bargaining, i.e. interactions where subjects experience both roles (proposer and
responder), where existing models are known to struggle with capturing behavior. Besides
majority bargaining as analyzed here, RDA also explains behavior in demand bargaining
(Breitmoser and Tan, 2013), in the wide selection of simple distribution and bargaining
games of Charness and Rabin (2002), where subject also play in both roles, and in the
three-player dictator and voting games of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2006), where the ultimate roles are not assigned when decisions are made.
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Clearly, there is much scope for further tests of RDA, but since existing theories of social
preferences are known to fail to explain experimental results across this range of inter-
actions, the reported results are rather encouraging. RDA seems to enable substantial
progress in jointly explaining bargaining behavior and distributional choice, and in partic-
ular in explaining the alleged context dependence of inequity aversion, efficiency concerns,
and egoism across in these interactions.
To conclude, this study shows that majority voting is a mechanism that facilitates
inequity under self-interest and a variety of social preferences. Nevertheless, equity is
observed when other parties in society have the opportunity to be recognized as formateur,
suggesting that both formateurs and voters are reference dependent altruistic.
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Table 5: Predictions for the Engelmann-Strobel, Bolton-Ockenfels and Charness-Rabin games
Observations Predictions (Probability of a1)
#Subj a1 a2 a3 Ego ARDA RRDA RecChar CR-Full IneqAv RDA FS-Full RDA-Ego
Predictions for Dictator Games in Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
Tax-F 68 0.84 0.1 0.06 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tax-E 68 0.4 0.24 0.37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.45 0 0
Tax-Fx 30 0.87 0.07 0.07 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tax-Ex 30 0.4 0.17 0.43 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.4
Envy-N 30 0.7 0.27 0.03 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.4
Envy-Nx 30 0.83 0.13 0.03 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
Envy-Ny 30 0.77 0.13 0.1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.4
Envy-Nyi 30 0.6 0.17 0.23 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.4
RPG-R 30 0.27 0.2 0.53 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RPG-P 30 0.6 0.07 0.33 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.4
RPG-Ey 30 0.4 0.23 0.37 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.4
Predictions for Voting Games in Bolton and Ockenfels (2006)
Player 1
Straight Game I 24 0.25 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Straight Game II 24 0.33 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Straight Game III 24 0.21 0.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equal Game I 24 0.12 0.88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equal Game II 24 0.25 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equal Game III 24 0.17 0.83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Player 2
Straight Game II 24 0.88 0.12 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
Equal Game II 24 0.92 0.08 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Player 3
Straight Game II 24 0.38 0.62 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 0.4 0.4
Equal Game II 24 0.25 0.75 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 0.4 0.4
Players 2 and 3
Straight Game I 48 0.48 0.52 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.55 1 1
Straight Game III 48 0.88 0.12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Equal Game I 24 0.17 0.83 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.55 1 1
Equal Game III 24 0.85 0.15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Predictions for Dictator Games in Charness and Rabin (2002)
DG2-Berk29 26 0.31 0.69 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 1 1
DG2-Barc2 48 0.52 0.48 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DG2-Berk17 32 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DG2-Berk23 36 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
DG2-Barc8 36 0.67 0.33 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
DG2-Berk15 22 0.27 0.73 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
DG2-Berk26 32 0.78 0.22 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
DG3-Berk24 24 0.54 0.46 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: The action labeled “a1” corresponds with A in ES04 and BO06, and with O,L in CR; “a2” corresponds with B in ES04 and BO06, and E,R in CR02; “a3” corresponds with “C” in ES04. The listed
predictions concern the probability of a1; the remaining probabilities follow immediately considering that no theory uniquely predicts B in ES04.
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Observations Predictions (Probability of a1)
#Subj a1 a2 a3 Ego ARDA RRDA RecChar CR-Full IneqAv RDA FS-Full RDA-Ego
Predictions for Player 1 of Response Games in Charness and Rabin (2002)
RG2-Barc7 36 0.47 0.53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RG2-Barc5 36 0.39 0.61 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 0.4 0.4
RG2-Berk28 32 0.5 0.5 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.4
RG2-Berk32 26 0.85 0.15 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.45 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Barc3 42 0.74 0.26 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Barc4 42 0.83 0.17 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2s-Berk21 36 0.47 0.53 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Barc6 36 0.92 0.08 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Barc9 36 0.69 0.31 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Berk25 32 0.62 0.38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Berk19 32 0.56 0.44 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Berk14 22 0.68 0.32 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2s-Barc1 44 0.96 0.04 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Berk13 22 0.86 0.14 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Berk18 32 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
RG2h-Barc11 35 0.54 0.46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.45 0 0
RG2h-Berk32 36 0.39 0.61 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.45 0 0
RG2h-Berk27 32 0.41 0.59 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.4 0
RG2h-Berk31 26 0.73 0.27 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4
RG2h-Berk30 26 0.77 0.23 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.4
RG3-Berk16 15 0.93 0.07 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4
RG3-Berk20 21 0.95 0.05 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4
Predictions for Player 2 of Response Games in Charness and Rabin (2002)
RG2-Barc7 36 0.06 0.94 1 0 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.55 1 1
RG2-Barc5 36 0.33 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 1 1
RG2-Berk28 32 0.34 0.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RG2-Berk32 26 0.35 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RG2s-Barc3 42 0.62 0.38 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Barc4 42 0.62 0.38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RG2s-Berk21 36 0.61 0.39 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Barc6 36 0.75 0.25 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Barc9 36 0.94 0.06 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
RG2s-Berk25 32 0.81 0.19 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
RG2s-Berk19 32 0.22 0.78 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
RG2s-Berk14 22 0.45 0.55 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2s-Barc1 44 0.93 0.07 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Berk13 22 0.82 0.18 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.55 1 1
RG2s-Berk18 32 0.44 0.56 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2h-Barc11 35 0.89 0.11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RG2h-Berk32 36 0.97 0.03 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RG2h-Berk27 32 0.91 0.09 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2h-Berk31 26 0.88 0.12 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG2h-Berk30 26 0.88 0.12 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6 1
RG3-Berk16 15 0.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RG3-Berk20 21 0.86 0.14 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
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Overview
Section 2 contains the experimental instructions for the treatment PB95. Section
3 provides basic strategy estimates and shows that stationarity and truncation
consistency are not violated significantly. Section 4 describes the structural model
used in the analysis (stationary nested logit equilibrium). Sections 5 and 6 contain
the Tables with goodness-of-fit measures and parameter estimates for all models
reported in the paper and a few additional models that we estimated to verify the
robustness of the conclusions drawn in the paper. These tables are directly based
on the output of the scripts that we used to run the optimization, which avoids the
possibility of mistakes due to retyping the results.
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1 Overview of tables
• Tables 1 and 4 contain the ICL-BIC measures for the goodness-of-fit and the
parameter estimates (respectively) of the models where all components are
based on the same social motive.
• Tables 2, 5, 6, and 7 contains the ICL-BIC measures and parameter estimates
of the models with up to four components and mixtures of social motives.
• Tables 3 and 8 contain the ICL-BIC measures for the goodness-of-fit and
the parameter estimates (respectively) of the heterogenous models where
proposers and voters may have different motives.
• Table 9 contains the estimates of models with time-dependent parameters.
The key used to distinguished these models is self-explanatory and equivalent
to the one used in the paper. The notation of the RDA utility functions is slightly
2
different than in the paper. Here, they are defined as follows.
UARDAi (x) = x i+α
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i≥x∗i +β
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix j<x∗i (1)
URRDAi (x) = x i−α
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i<x j−β
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i≥x j , (2)
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2 Experimental instructions for PB95
The following is a literal translation of the experimental instructions for PB95. The
original instructions and control questionnaires (in German) for all treatments are
available from the authors.
Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on decision making. The experiment is
divided into 10 stages. In each stage you are assigned to one of four groups by
the computer, with 3 participants per group (including you). After each stage you
are assigned to a new group. You are paid based on a randomly chosen “payment
stage.” You are paid your payment from this stage in Euros. In addition, you get 4
Euros that are independent of your actions.
Your task In each stage, 24 Euros are to be allocated. First, one participant is
assigned the A role, and the other two group members are assigned the B role.
These assignments are random, and all group members have the same probability
of being assigned the A role. The A participant makes a proposal on how to allocate
the 24 Euros. Then, the B participants vote on the proposal, with either “yes” or
“no.” If at least one B participant agrees with the proposal (i.e. votes “yes”), then
the allocation is implemented and the stage ends. If no B participant votes “yes,”
then
• with 95% probability and new round starts, where again a player is assigned
the A role randomly, and
• with 5% probability the current stage ends. In this case, all participants
obtain 0 Euros.
General remarks In each stage the three members of a group are referred to
as Participant 1, Participant 2, and Participant 3. The numbering is random, and
it is made whenever a new group is formed (i.e. in the beginning of each stage).
Thus, it may happen that you are referred to as Participant 3 in one stage and as
Participant 1 in another. The numbering is held constant for the duration of a stage.
The assignment of A and B roles is independent of the numbering, i.e. in the first
round of a stage Participant 2 may be assigned the A role and in a possible second
round this may be Participant 3. It may also happen that one of the participants is
assigned the A role in two or more consecutive rounds (while multiple successive
assignments are relatively unlikely).
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As for the allocation proposed by the A participant, the following is to be
acknowledged. No participant may be allocated less than 0 Euros, no one may be
allocated more than 24 Euros, and in total no more than 24 Euros can be allocated.
It is not mandatory that the whole 24 Euros are allocated. It is possible to allocate
fractional numbers such as “0.80” (= 0 Euros and 80 cents). Fractions of a cent
may not be allocated.
3 Basic characteristics of subjects’ strategies
We estimate the strategies by considering regression models that include a range
of independent variables that may be relevant for the strategic task at hand, i.e. we
include the variables that should be strategically relevant by theory and others that
could have been relevant for the subjects. We control for the game number minus 1
within the session (=G), for the round number minus 1 within the game (=R), and
for the interdependence induced by the experimental design (by considering two
levels of random effects, “Session” and “Subjects within Session”). The proposals
are denoted as (xp, xh, x l) as in the paper; the components refer to the proposer
share, the higher offer to a voter, the lower offer to a voter (respectively). In case
of x l , we also control for an interaction with xh. Significance at the 5% level is
denoted by ∗ and significance at the 1% level by ∗∗. Due to the multiplicity of tests
made in this section, we require significance at the 1% level for significant results.1
xp = 11.121
∗∗
(0.4708)
−0.7479
(0.6367)
·G−1 −0.6157
(0.3637)
·R (3)
xh= 9.1337
∗∗
(0.3307)
−1.7445∗∗
(0.4974)
·G−1+0.2521
(0.2844)
·R (4)
x l = 6.8040
∗∗
(0.8687)
+0.8941
(0.6272)
·G−1 +0.4254
(0.3506)
·R−0.3535∗∗
(0.0816)
· xh (5)
The intercept represents the initial proposal, i.e. the average proposal in the first
round of the first game (aside from the interaction with xh). The initial value of xh
is about as predicted, but it increases significantly (albeit small in absolute terms)
as the subjects gain experience. In addition, there is a strong crowding-out effect
between security in vote buying (increasing xh) and non-strategic giving to the
third player (x l). The round index R in Eqs. (3)–(5) is insignificant, indicating that
stationarity is not significantly violated.
Result 1. There is no significant round effect in the proposal functions in PB95, which
indicates that stationarity is not violated.
1This corresponds approximately with both the Bonferroni correction and the Sidak correction
for 5-6 tests where the probability of a false positive is supposed to be at 0.05.
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In PB00, the estimated proposal functions differ only slightly (note that the
round number R is dropped, since there is just a single round in these games).
xp = 11.187
∗∗
(0.5379)
−3.2105∗∗
(0.7827)
·G−1 (6)
xh= 9.5751
∗∗
(0.3891)
−2.5177∗∗
(0.6731)
·G−1 (7)
x l = 4.4923
∗∗
(1.1133)
+2.5508∗∗
(0.8666)
·G−1−0.1147
(0.1003)
· xh (8)
Compared to PB95, there is no significant crowding out between xh and x l , and
the increase of xp and xh as the subjects gain experience is sharper, again at the
expense of the non-strategic donation x l toward the third player.
2
To ascertain truncation consistency, we test whether the proposal functions
estimated above, Eqs. (3)–(5) and Eqs. (6)–(8), differ significantly. To this end, we
compare the model where the proposal function coefficients depend on treatment
(PB95 or PB00) with the simpler model where the coefficients do not depend on
treatment. In likelihood-ratio tests, the differences are insignificant at the .01
level in all three dimensions, but they are close to that threshold with respect to
x l (the p-values of the likelihood-ratio tests are p= .064 for xp, p= .24 for xh,
and p= .011 for x l). Also in view of the non-parametric tests supporting Result
3.1, we conclude that the proposal functions do not violate truncation consistency,
especially with respects to xp and xh.
Result 2. Proposal functions do not differ significantly between PB95 and PB00,
which indicates that truncation consistency is not violated.
We now turn to the voting functions. We model the voting decisions using
binomial logit regression with random effects as described above. We consider G,
R, the own payoff x i as proposed, the proposer’s payoff xp, an indicator IC P that is
1 iff x i ≥ 7.60 (which is the expected continuation payoff), and indicator Ih that
is 1 iff one has the high payoff under the proposal in the sense x i =max{x1, x2}.
Theoretically, only IC P should be significant. The estimated voting function in
PB95 is (where =ˆ represents the logit link)
σv =ˆ −2.6013∗∗
(0.7440)
+1.7477∗∗
(0.5002)
·G−1+0.1747
(0.2797)
·R +1.6930∗∗
(0.3812)
· IC P
+0.5899∗∗
(0.0919)
· x i −0.2647∗∗
(0.0506)
· xp+1.0692∗∗
(0.3931)
· Ih (9)
2The fact that these effects do not add up to 0 numerically relates to the observation that the
subjects get better in hitting the ¤24 available overall as the sessions progress.
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and the voting function in PB00 is
σv =ˆ −4.6670∗∗
(1.3766)
+2.6185∗
(1.0606)
·G−1 +3.1550∗∗
(0.8251)
· IC P
+0.4891∗∗
(0.1588)
· x i −0.0582
(0.0962)
· xp −0.9085
(0.8379)
· Ih. (10)
Result 3. There is no significant round effect in the voting functions in PB95, which
indicates that stationarity is not violated.
The acceptance probability in PB95 depends negatively on the proposer’s
payoff xp and on whether x i ≥ x j (i.e. that one has been offered the high payoff),
suggesting fairness-like concerns albeit not the type predicted by inequity aversion.
The hypothesis that the coefficients of these voting functions equate between the
treatments using likelihood-ratio tests cannot be rejected at the maintained .01
level (p= .026).
Result 4. Voting functions in PB95 and PB00 do not differ significantly, which
indicates that truncation consistency is not violated.
4 Stationary (nested) logit equilibrium
Given a utility function ui :RN →R for player i ∈ N and well-defined continuation
strategies, let vi(x) denote the expected utility of i as a proposer when proposing
x∈X. Player i chooses the proposal to maximize the random utility v˜i(x) = vi(x)+
εi,x, where εi,x has generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution (McFadden,
1978). This model yields the family of GEV proposal functions. If (εi,x) have
extreme value distribution, multinomial logit choices result, i.e.
σi(x) = exp{λ · vi(x)}/
∑
x˜∈X
exp{λ · vi(x˜)} ∀x∈X. (11)
To define the nesting structure in nested logit equilibrium, let u˜ denote the
continuation utilities (which is symmetric between players). Two proposals x′,x′′ ∈
X are in the same subset Y∈ Y if and only if ui(x′)≥ u˜⇔ ui(x′′)≥ u˜ for i = 1,2.
Given Y, two proposals x′,x′′ ∈ Y are in the same subset Z ∈ Z(Y) if and only if
bx ′i/2c= bx ′′i /2c for i= 1,2.
Now, we can define the nested logit choice probability (McFadden, 1984) of
proposal x= (xp, x1, x2). Let u1(x) and u2(x) denote the respective utilities of
voter 1 and 2. The probability of choosing x∈X is
σi(x) =Q(x | Z) ·Q(Z | Y) ·Q(Y) (12)
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for x∈ Z, Z∈ Z(Y), and Y∈ Y, with
Q(x | Z) = expλp · vi(x)	/pZ pZ=∑
x˜∈Z
exp

λp · vi(x˜)	
Q(Z | Y) = expρ′ · ln pZ	/pY pY= ∑
Z˜∈Z(Y)
exp

ρ′ · ln pZ˜	
Q(Y) = exp

ρ′′ · ln pY	/p p=∑
Y˜∈Y
exp

ρ′′ · ln pY˜	 ,
where (λp,ρ′,ρ′′) are precision and interdependence parameters.3 Multinomial
logit results if ρ′=ρ′′= 1, while violations of multinomiality result for ρ′,ρ′′ ∈
(0,1).
Following the majority bargaining literature, we focus on symmetric equilibria.
That is, all players have the same preferences and the same proposal and voting
functions. Symmetric (stationary) QREs of our random-proposer games are fully
characterized by a duple (σp,σv), where σp ∈∆(X) is the proposal function (of
each player), and σv : X→ [0,1] is the voting function. As above, U : X→ R
denotes the players’ utility function.4 Define u˜ ∈ R as the disagreement utility
under (σp,σv), i.e. the expected utility in case the next proposal is not accepted,
and initially let us take it as given. The logit voting function σv solves
5
σv(x
1|u˜) = exp{λ
v ·U(x1)}
exp{λv ·U(x1)}+exp{λv(σv(x2|u˜)∗U(x1)+(1−σv(x2|u˜))∗ u˜)} .
(13)
The corresponding probability that x will be accepted, conditional on u˜ and σv, is
Pr(x) = 1−1−σvx1|u˜1−σvx2|u˜ . (14)
and thus the expected utility of the proposer from proposing x∈X is
vi(x) = Pr(x) ·ui(x)+(1−Pr(x)) · u˜. (15)
Given vi, the proposal function σp is defined by Eq. (12). We allow for het-
erogenous precision parameters λp and λv for proposers and voters, respectively,
3McFadden (1984, p. 1422ff) provides the distribution of the random utility component that
gives rise to this three-level nested logit model.
4Also as above, the argument of U(x), i.e. x= (x1, x2, x3), is understood to have the payoff of
the respective player as x1, and the opponents’ payoffs as x2 and x3. We assume U(x1, x2, x3) =
U(x1, x3, x2).
5The following expression uses a notation of permutations of x∈X. In general, x is in the order
(xp, x1, x2), i.e. the first value refers to the proposer, the second value to the first voter, and the
third value to the second voter. We define x1 := (x1, xp, x2) and x2 := (x2, xp, x1).
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because their choice problems have different complexity (following e.g. Rogers
et al., 2009). Finally, let u ∈RN denote the expected payoff of all i ∈ N under
(σp,σv), and define
u=δ ·(u1+u2+u3)/3+(1−δ) ·U(0,0,0). (16)
In any stationary QRE of PB95, u˜= u. We determine the equilibrium (σp,σv) by
function iteration using the starting value u˜=U(7,7,7). The stationary equilibrium
is unique if and only if the voting equilibria (13) are unique for all proposals x∈X,
but conditions for the latter do not seem available. In our computations, the
function iteration generally converged quickly to the fixed point (u˜= u), which
suggests that the equilibrium is stable and locally unique.6
The strategy profile (σp,σv) is the symmetric QRE of PB00 for u˜=U(7.6,7.6,7.6).
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unit used in the structural analysis is ¤0.2 (most actual proposals had been multiples of it, and the
remaining few had been rounded appropriately).
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5 Overview model fit (BIC)
The following tables complement those of the paper by providing the BIC measures
for goodness-of-fit.
Table 1: Goodness of fits of logit and nested logit models
Number of types
Logit Eq. One Two Three
CES 4513 3993 3869 3672
Ineq 4571 3836 3685 3640
RRDA 4132 3668 3454 3464
ARDA 4344 3622 3469 3481
Table 2: Goodness of fits of mixed multi-type models
Added type
CES IneqAv RRDA ARDA
CES + 3869 3719 3574 3593
IneqAv + 3719 3685 3520 3510
RRDA + 3574 3520 3454 3396
ARDA + 3593 3510 3396 3469
CES + IneqAv + 3711 3715 3488 3509
CES + RRDA + 3475 3487 3493 3396
IneqAv + ARDA + 3509 3496 3382 3501
RRDA + ARDA + 3396 3383 3387 3402
Table 3: Goodness of fits of heterogenous models
Voter type
Proposer CES IneqAv RRDA ARDA
CES + 3996 3936 4164 4099
IneqAv + 3741 3839 3709 3547
RRDA + 3748 3835 3650 3605
ARDA + 3756 3910 3784 3597
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6 Parameter estimates
The notation of the RDA utility functions is slightly different than in the paper.
Here, they are defined as follows.
UARDAi (x) = x i+α
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i≥x∗i +β
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix j<x∗i (17)
URRDAi (x) = x i−α
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i<x j−β
∑
j 6=i
x j · Ix i≥x j , (18)
Table 4: Parameter estimates for logit and nested logit models without mixture of
motives
Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
CES models
CES 1 1
(NaN)
19.811
(0.051)
6.618
(0.018)
0.66
(0.001)
0.957
(0.001)
4513.13
−4497.99
0.645
CES 1 1
(NaN)
26.479
(0.017)
0.224
(0)
0.635
(0.002)
0.982
(0.003)
0.628
(0)
0.778
(0)
3992.96
−3970.25
0.7937
CES +
CES
1 0.817
(NaN)
46.219
(0.372)
0.246
(0)
0.989
(0.001)
0.906
(0.007)
0.654
(0)
0.929
(0)
2 0.183
(0.04)
0.143
(0.004)
0.002
(0.003)
0.461
(0.008)
0.218
(0.004)
0.406
(0.001)
0.905
(0)
3890.92
−3820.25
0.8232
CES +
CES +
CES
1 0.454
(NaN)
46.717
(0.338)
0.271
(0)
0.907
(0.002)
13.22
(0.121)
0.659
(0)
0.939
(0)
2 0.336
(0.053)
2.128
(0.001)
0.192
(0.001)
0.007
(0.002)
0.026
(0.002)
0.288
(0)
1.163
(0)
3 0.21
(0.046)
3.592
(0.05)
0.147
(0.001)
0.033
(0.001)
0.269
(0.002)
0.032
(0.001)
1.327
(0.01)
3702.54
−3596.73
0.8595
IneqAv models
IneqAv 1 1
(NaN)
3.721
(0.051)
0.001
(0)
0
(0)
0.382
(0.002)
4570.67
−4555.53
0.6233
IneqAv 1 1
(NaN)
4.181
(0)
0.155
(0.002)
0.013
(0)
0.524
(0.006)
0.006
(0)
0.052
(0)
3835.85
−3813.13
0.8245
IneqAv +
IneqAv
1 0.608
(NaN)
6.188
(0.006)
0.137
(0.002)
0.013
(0.001)
0.57
(0.004)
0.001
(0)
0.071
(0.001)
2 0.392
(0.052)
3.712
(0.043)
0.258
(0.003)
0.714
(0.006)
0
(0)
0.504
(0)
0.532
(0)
3700.56
−3635.31
0.8538
IneqAv +
IneqAv +
IneqAv
1 0.46
(NaN)
7.068
(0.062)
0.148
(0.001)
0.038
(0)
0.458
(0.002)
0.055
(0.002)
0.049
(0)
2 0.391
(0.052)
7.756
(0.092)
0.244
(0.003)
0.756
(0.001)
0
(0)
0.599
(0.001)
0.444
(0)
3 0.149
(0.039)
2.352
(0.014)
0.158
(0.001)
0.049
(0.002)
1.376
(0.009)
0.021
(0)
0.18
(0.002)
3666.14
−3564.36
0.8641
RRDA models
continued on next page
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Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
RRDA 1 1
(NaN)
5.173
(0.023)
0.308
(0.001)
−1.014
(0.002)
−1.106
(0.002)
4131.97
−4116.82
0.7601
RRDA 1 1
(NaN)
2.812
(0.015)
0.174
(0.001)
0.124
(0)
0.088
(0)
−0.357
(0)
−0.899
(0)
3668.32
−3645.6
0.8523
RRDA +
RRDA
1 0.718
(NaN)
3.745
(0.022)
0.17
(NaN)
0.113
(NaN)
0.013
(NaN)
−0.335
(NaN)
−1.118
(0)
2 0.282
(0.045)
3.483
(0.066)
0.18
(0.003)
0.203
(0)
1.922
(0)
−0.407
(0)
−0.416
(0)
3469.22
−3404.59
0.8847
RRDA +
RRDA +
RRDA
1 0.549
(NaN)
8.06
(0.097)
0.179
(0.001)
0.349
(0.003)
0
(NaN)
0.4
(NaN)
−0.975
(0.003)
2 0.184
(0.042)
0.813
(0.018)
0.135
(0.003)
0.153
(0.002)
0.008
(0.001)
0.353
(0.006)
0.079
(0.002)
3 0.267
(0.049)
5.163
(0.067)
0.145
(0.002)
0.007
(0.001)
1.008
(0.005)
−0.131
(0.001)
−0.147
(0)
3486.81
−3388.14
0.8867
ARDA models
ARDA 1 1
(NaN)
4.112
(0.012)
0.412
(0.006)
1.056
(0.006)
0.989
(0.002)
4344.01
−4328.86
0.7017
ARDA 1 1
(NaN)
3.734
(0.024)
0.11
(0)
0.184
(0.001)
0.181
(0.001)
0.962
(0.005)
0.375
(0)
3621.68
−3598.96
0.8592
ARDA +
ARDA
1 0.566
(NaN)
4.26
(0.039)
0.122
(0)
0.053
(0.002)
0.072
(0.002)
0.957
(0.029)
0.234
(0)
2 0.434
(0.054)
4.268
(0.028)
0.163
(0.001)
0.259
(0.011)
1.384
(0.029)
0.49
(NaN)
0.4
(NaN)
3488.86
−3419.37
0.883
ARDA +
ARDA +
ARDA
1 0.526
(NaN)
4.486
(0.029)
0.132
(0.001)
0.082
(0.001)
0.091
(0.001)
0.967
(0.007)
0.368
(0)
2 0.373
(0.055)
4.34
(0.072)
0.187
(0.001)
0.199
(0.001)
1.146
(0.002)
0.454
(0.002)
0.375
(0)
3 0.101
(0.035)
0.63
(0.069)
0.089
(0.005)
0.288
(0.015)
0.203
(0.012)
−0.015
(0.009)
−0.505
(0.001)
3512.42
−3405.69
0.8846
Table 5: Two-type mixed models
Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
CES + . . .
CES +
CES
1 0.817
(NaN)
46.219
(0.05)
0.246
(0.001)
0.989
(0.003)
0.906
(0.002)
0.654
(0)
0.929
(0)
2 0.183
(0.04)
0.143
(0.003)
0.002
(0.001)
0.461
(0.019)
0.218
(0.005)
0.406
(0)
0.905
(0)
3890.93
−3820.27
0.8232
CES + In-
eqAv
1 0.326
(NaN)
29.01
(0.06)
0.356
(0)
0.634
(0.001)
5.34
(0.037)
0.654
(0.001)
0.776
(0.001)
2 0.674
(0.049)
5.974
(0.019)
0.153
(0)
0.002
(0)
0.435
(0)
0.015
(0)
0.066
(0)
3730.59
−3669.38
0.8486
CES +
RRDA
1 0.318
(NaN)
28.578
(0.024)
0.291
(0.001)
0.675
(0.004)
8.953
(0.111)
0.655
(0)
0.86
(0)
2 0.682
(0.054)
4.189
(0.051)
0.168
(0.001)
0.118
(0.001)
0.065
(0.002)
−0.327
(NaN)
−0.679
(0.005)
3591.86
−3524.56
0.8696
CES +
ARDA
1 0.134
(NaN)
27.74
(0.174)
0.251
(0.001)
0.631
(0)
4.852
(0.013)
0.643
(0)
0.727
(0.002)
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Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
2 0.866
(0.034)
3.502
(0.021)
0.16
(0.001)
0.112
(0)
0.173
(0)
0.885
(0.004)
0.368
(0)
3607.17
−3543.43
0.867
IneqAv + . . .
IneqAv +
CES
1 0.675
(NaN)
6.124
(0.203)
0.149
(0.005)
0.003
(0.004)
0.433
(0.006)
0.015
(0)
0.065
(0)
2 0.325
(0.049)
32.592
(0.034)
0.357
(0.001)
0.633
(0.003)
4.495
(0.053)
0.654
(0)
0.779
(0)
3730.81
−3669.48
0.8486
IneqAv +
IneqAv
1 0.602
(NaN)
6.163
(0.007)
0.136
(0)
0.02
(0)
0.569
(0.002)
0.003
(0)
0.071
(0)
2 0.398
(0.052)
3.712
(0)
0.239
(0)
0.691
(0.01)
0
(0)
0.511
(0.007)
0.541
(0)
3701.2
−3635.59
0.8538
IneqAv +
RRDA
1 0.258
(NaN)
2.596
(0.086)
0.188
(0.004)
0.096
(NaN)
2.445
(0.034)
0.011
(NaN)
0.046
(NaN)
2 0.742
(0.047)
5.928
(0.072)
0.133
(0.004)
0.097
(0.001)
0
(0)
−0.438
(0.003)
−1.141
(0.011)
3534.5
−3470.35
0.8767
IneqAv +
ARDA
1 0.34
(NaN)
8.373
(0.019)
0.131
(0.001)
0.008
(0)
0.466
(0.003)
0.023
(0)
0.071
(0)
2 0.66
(0.05)
2.547
(0.012)
0.122
(0.001)
0.005
(0.001)
0.168
(0.001)
1.102
(0.009)
0.337
(0)
3524.85
−3460.97
0.8778
RRDA + . . .
RRDA +
CES
1 0.693
(NaN)
4.121
(0.02)
0.175
(NaN)
0.12
(0.001)
0.062
(NaN)
−0.325
(NaN)
−0.678
(0.003)
2 0.307
(0.052)
28.717
(0.298)
0.281
(0.001)
0.684
(0.001)
8.95
(0.072)
0.641
(0)
0.87
(0)
3591.48
−3524.66
0.8696
RRDA +
IneqAv
1 0.746
(NaN)
5.878
(0.014)
0.133
(0.001)
0.097
(0.001)
0
(0)
−0.422
(0.003)
−1.115
(0.001)
2 0.254
(0.047)
2.579
(0)
0.188
(0)
0.097
(0.001)
2.444
(0.071)
0.012
(0.001)
0.046
(0.001)
3534.87
−3470.54
0.8766
RRDA +
RRDA
1 0.718
(NaN)
3.745
(0.032)
0.17
(NaN)
0.113
(NaN)
0.013
(NaN)
−0.335
(NaN)
−1.118
(0)
2 0.282
(0.045)
3.483
(0.039)
0.18
(0.002)
0.203
(0)
1.922
(0)
−0.407
(0)
−0.416
(0)
3469.22
−3404.59
0.8847
RRDA +
ARDA
1 0.552
(NaN)
5.542
(0.093)
0.145
(0.004)
0.101
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.27
(0.002)
−0.998
(0.007)
2 0.448
(0.054)
3.332
(0.042)
0.119
(0)
0.088
(0)
0.317
(0.002)
0.795
(0.006)
0.334
(0)
3415.11
−3346.74
0.8914
ARDA + . . .
ARDA +
CES
1 0.866
(NaN)
3.501
(0.003)
0.16
(0)
0.111
(0)
0.173
(0)
0.885
(0.001)
0.367
(0)
2 0.134
(0.034)
27.741
(0.089)
0.251
(0.001)
0.631
(0.003)
4.852
(0.053)
0.643
(0)
0.727
(0.001)
3607.18
−3543.45
0.867
ARDA +
IneqAv
1 0.66
(NaN)
2.546
(0.055)
0.122
(0.001)
0.011
(0.001)
0.168
(0.001)
1.101
(0.058)
0.334
(0)
2 0.34
(0.05)
8.34
(0.329)
0.133
(0.002)
0.007
(0.004)
0.466
(0.019)
0.026
(0.003)
0.069
(0.005)
3524.8
−3461.07
0.8778
ARDA +
RRDA
1 0.448
(NaN)
3.332
(0.042)
0.119
(0)
0.088
(0)
0.317
(0.002)
0.795
(0.006)
0.334
(0)
2 0.552
(0.054)
5.542
(0.093)
0.145
(0.004)
0.101
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.27
(0.002)
−0.998
(0.007)
3415.11
−3346.74
0.8914
ARDA +
ARDA
1 0.566
(NaN)
4.26
(0.025)
0.122
(0.002)
0.053
(0.001)
0.072
(0)
0.957
(0.004)
0.234
(0)
2 0.434
(0.054)
4.268
(0.017)
0.163
(0.001)
0.259
(0.001)
1.384
(0.008)
0.49
(NaN)
0.4
(NaN)
3488.85
−3419.37
0.883
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Table 6: Three-type mixed models
Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
CES + Inequity Aversion + . . .
CES +
IneqAv +
CES
1 0.124
(NaN)
29.019
(0.063)
0.353
(0.003)
0.638
(0.002)
7.398
(0.037)
0.657
(0)
0.916
(0)
2 0.678
(0.056)
5.922
(0.045)
0.156
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
0.431
(0.005)
0.014
(0.001)
0.064
(0)
3 0.198
(0.058)
20.875
(0.085)
0.318
(0.001)
0.644
(0.002)
0.958
(0.007)
0.628
(0)
0.735
(0)
3744.59
−3635.41
0.8538
CES +
IneqAv +
IneqAv
1 0.171
(NaN)
41.84
(0.105)
0.364
(0)
0.632
(0.001)
5.421
(0.059)
0.65
(0)
0.805
(0)
2 0.637
(0.055)
7.079
(0.082)
0.153
(0)
0.005
(0.001)
0.439
(0.005)
0.016
(0.001)
0.067
(0.001)
3 0.192
(0.053)
3.111
(0.098)
0.153
(0.003)
0.032
(0.003)
0.521
(0.013)
0
(0.002)
0.198
(0.007)
3750.76
−3639.68
0.8532
CES +
IneqAv +
RRDA
1 0.146
(NaN)
28.331
(0.068)
0.304
(0)
0.679
(0)
9.137
(0.004)
0.667
(0)
0.884
(0)
2 0.195
(0.04)
4.176
(0.003)
0.272
(0.002)
0.035
(0.001)
0.541
(0.001)
0.034
(0)
0.044
(0)
3 0.659
(0.05)
4.24
(0.068)
0.198
(0)
0.101
(0.001)
0.039
(0.001)
−0.322
(0.003)
−1.019
(0.001)
3513.83
−3411.81
0.8839
CES +
IneqAv +
ARDA
1 0.064
(NaN)
20.263
(0.006)
0.24
(0)
0.635
(0)
2.465
(0.001)
0.667
(0)
0.874
(0)
2 0.309
(0.048)
8.874
(0.026)
0.127
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
0.456
(0.002)
0.02
(0.001)
0.071
(0.001)
3 0.627
(0.051)
2.589
(0.002)
0.129
(0)
0.018
(0.001)
0.147
(0.001)
1.203
(0.005)
0.346
(0)
3533.83
−3432.93
0.8813
CES + RRDA + . . .
CES +
RRDA +
CES
1 0.269
(NaN)
31.285
(0.047)
0.299
(0)
0.669
(0.001)
12.829
(0.027)
0.66
(0)
1.003
(0.001)
2 0.664
(0.05)
4.373
(0.041)
0.167
(0.001)
0.07
(0)
0.004
(0.001)
−0.345
(0.002)
−1.092
(0)
3 0.066
(0.028)
21.068
(0.085)
0.309
(0.003)
0.61
(0.006)
0.949
(0.016)
0.593
(0.001)
0.6
(0.001)
3500.23
−3399.68
0.8853
CES +
RRDA +
IneqAv
1 0.146
(NaN)
28.331
(0.008)
0.304
(0)
0.679
(0)
9.137
(0.003)
0.667
(0)
0.884
(0)
2 0.659
(0.051)
4.24
(0.06)
0.198
(0.002)
0.101
(0.001)
0.039
(0)
−0.322
(0.002)
−1.019
(0.004)
3 0.195
(0.042)
4.176
(0.033)
0.272
(0.002)
0.035
(0.001)
0.541
(0.005)
0.033
(0)
0.044
(0)
3513.64
−3411.55
0.8839
CES +
RRDA +
RRDA
1 0.161
(NaN)
28.22
(0.216)
0.314
(0.001)
0.653
(0.001)
11.618
(0.087)
0.65
(0)
0.923
(0.001)
2 0.637
(0.057)
4.237
(0.061)
0.16
(0.002)
0.127
(0.001)
0.03
(0.001)
−0.317
(0.005)
−1.076
(0)
3 0.202
(0.054)
3.001
(0.002)
0.196
(0)
0.148
(0)
0.13
(0)
−0.252
(0)
−0.572
(0)
3531.01
−3417.68
0.8832
CES +
RRDA +
ARDA
1 0.062
(NaN)
30.315
(0.099)
0.201
(0.001)
0.78
(0.004)
0.956
(0.015)
0.639
(0)
0.751
(0.001)
2 0.484
(0.055)
5.213
(0.015)
0.138
(0.001)
0.097
(0.001)
0
(0)
−0.274
(0.001)
−1.001
(0.007)
3 0.454
(0.055)
3.361
(0.002)
0.133
(0.001)
0.08
(0)
0.351
(0.002)
0.805
(0)
0.334
(0)
3423.75
−3320.16
0.8943
Inequity Aversion + ARDA + . . .
IneqAv +
ARDA +
CES
1 0.309
(NaN)
8.874
(0.053)
0.127
(0.001)
0.006
(0)
0.456
(0.004)
0.02
(0)
0.071
(0)
2 0.627
(0.051)
2.589
(0.057)
0.129
(0.002)
0.018
(0.005)
0.147
(0)
1.203
(0.012)
0.346
(0)
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Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
3 0.064
(0.024)
20.263
(0.006)
0.24
(0)
0.635
(0.003)
2.465
(0.016)
0.667
(0)
0.874
(0)
3533.8
−3432.9
0.8813
IneqAv +
ARDA +
IneqAv
1 0.32
(NaN)
8.342
(0.005)
0.131
(0)
0.013
(0)
0.515
(0.001)
0.002
(0)
0.078
(0)
2 0.627
(0.052)
3.179
(0.018)
0.141
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
0.102
(0)
1.006
(0.005)
0.353
(0)
3 0.054
(0.022)
0.636
(0.002)
0.176
(0.001)
0.029
(0.002)
1.469
(0.042)
0.001
(0.001)
0.091
(0)
3517.12
−3420.48
0.8828
IneqAv +
ARDA +
RRDA
1 0.073
(NaN)
0.894
(0)
0.157
(0.003)
0.011
(0.001)
0.498
(0.011)
0.004
(0)
0.056
(0.001)
2 0.447
(0.055)
4.608
(0.078)
0.148
(0.001)
0.024
(0.002)
0.326
(0.005)
0.726
(0.011)
0.372
(0)
3 0.48
(0.055)
5.659
(0.034)
0.127
(0.001)
0.094
(0.001)
0
(0.001)
−0.277
(0.003)
−1
(0.006)
3404.32
−3306.36
0.8958
IneqAv +
ARDA +
ARDA
1 0.335
(NaN)
8.433
(0.037)
0.136
(0.001)
0.012
(0.002)
0.547
(0.006)
0.001
(0.002)
0.084
(NaN)
2 0.455
(0.058)
2.448
(0.027)
0.099
(0.002)
0.007
(0.001)
0.271
(0.003)
1.177
(0.023)
0.338
(0)
3 0.21
(0.046)
4.461
(0.06)
0.198
(0)
0.071
(0.002)
0.003
(0.001)
0.942
(0.01)
0.368
(0.001)
3537
−3425.01
0.8823
RRDA + ARDA + . . .
RRDA +
ARDA +
CES
1 0.484
(NaN)
5.213
(0.021)
0.138
(0.002)
0.097
(0.001)
0
(0.001)
−0.274
(0.003)
−1.001
(0.005)
2 0.454
(0.055)
3.361
(0.018)
0.133
(0.003)
0.08
(0.001)
0.351
(0.002)
0.805
(0)
0.334
(0)
3 0.062
(0.026)
30.315
(0.168)
0.201
(0.001)
0.78
(0.003)
0.956
(0.002)
0.639
(0)
0.751
(0.003)
3423.74
−3320.15
0.8943
RRDA +
ARDA +
IneqAv
1 0.481
(NaN)
5.653
(0.027)
0.127
(0.001)
0.094
(0)
0
(0)
−0.277
(0.002)
−0.996
(0)
2 0.447
(0.055)
4.604
(0.029)
0.148
(0)
0.024
(0.001)
0.328
(0.002)
0.732
(0.003)
0.36
(0)
3 0.072
(0.023)
0.894
(0.011)
0.157
(0.006)
0.011
(0.003)
0.498
(0.01)
0.004
(0)
0.056
(0.001)
3405.07
−3306.89
0.8958
RRDA +
ARDA +
RRDA
1 0.456
(NaN)
5.649
(0.08)
0.133
(0.002)
0.077
(0.003)
0
(0.001)
−0.275
(0.005)
−0.986
(0.008)
2 0.368
(0.052)
3.362
(0.033)
0.117
(0.007)
0.007
(0.011)
0.429
(0.002)
0.825
(0.006)
0.339
(0)
3 0.176
(0.047)
2.879
(0.002)
0.205
(0)
0.126
(0)
0.014
(0)
−0.269
(0)
−0.652
(0.001)
3422.73
−3310.86
0.8953
RRDA +
ARDA +
ARDA
1 0.483
(NaN)
5.297
(0.04)
0.129
(0.001)
0.085
(0.003)
0
(0)
−0.263
(0.003)
−0.99
(0.004)
2 0.316
(0.056)
3.312
(0.001)
0.114
(0)
0.164
(0)
0.66
(0.028)
0.79
(0.146)
0.337
(0)
3 0.201
(0.049)
2.677
(0.011)
0.168
(0)
0.034
(0.002)
0.084
(0.001)
0.927
(0.022)
0.353
(0)
3437.96
−3326.52
0.8936
Table 7: Four-type mixed model
Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
CES + IneqAv + RRDA + ARDA
CES +
IneqAv +
RRDA +
ARDA
1 0.061
(NaN)
17.001
(0.07)
0.353
(0.001)
0.646
(0.003)
5.419
(0.006)
0.676
(0)
0.791
(0.001)
2 0.136
(0.038)
8.371
(0.155)
0.156
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.439
(0.001)
0.014
(0.001)
0.058
(0.001)
3 0.419
(0.054)
5.151
(0.068)
0.131
(0.001)
0.094
(0.002)
0
(0.001)
−0.264
(0.002)
−1.002
(0.009)
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Type Share λp ρ1 ρ2 λv α β IC L/LL/R
2
4 0.385
(0.057)
3.469
(0.076)
0.125
(0.001)
0.097
(0.001)
0.323
(0.004)
0.833
(0.008)
0.334
(0)
3420.76
−3286.09
0.898
Table 8: Heterogenous models (proposer and voters may have different prefer-
ences). Does not improve goodness-of-fit
λp ρ1 ρ2 λv αProp βProp αVot βVot IC L/LL/R
2
Proposer CES + Voter . . .
CES 27.488
(0.073)
0.216
(0.001)
0.641
(0.002)
0.963
(0.009)
0.636
(0.001)
0.777
(0)
0.628
(0)
0.777
(0)
3995.85
−3965.56
0.7947
IneqAv 22.693
(0.041)
0.178
(0)
0.618
(0.002)
0.47
(0)
0.605
(0.002)
0.911
(0.002)
0.009
(0)
0.078
(0.001)
3935.75
−3905.46
0.807
RRDA 0.844
(0.01)
0.001
(0.001)
0.566
(0.008)
0.02
(0.001)
0.844
(0)
0.827
(0.002)
0.043
(0.001)
−0.198
(0)
4163.89
−4133.6
0.756
ARDA 0.853
(0.008)
0.001
(0.002)
0.583
(0.016)
0.22
(0.002)
0.833
(0.005)
0.804
(0.007)
1.105
(0.018)
0.299
(0)
4099.38
−4069.09
0.7716
Proposer IneqAv + Voter . . .
CES 2.983
(0.008)
0.195
(0.001)
0.021
(0)
0.822
(0)
0.17
(0.001)
0.166
(0)
0.501
(0.001)
0.732
(0)
3740.52
−3710.23
0.8421
IneqAv 4.042
(0)
0.16
(0)
0.013
(0)
0.527
(0)
0.085
(0)
0.052
(0)
0
(0)
0.052
(0)
3839.31
−3809.02
0.8252
RRDA 6.097
(0.016)
0.143
(0)
0.065
(0)
0.355
(0)
0.167
(0.001)
0.269
(0)
0.099
(0)
0.115
(0)
3708.69
−3678.4
0.8472
ARDA 6.874
(0.072)
0.162
(0.002)
0.133
(0.001)
0.258
(0.003)
0.02
(0.001)
0.336
(0)
0.868
(0)
0.131
(0)
3547.13
−3516.84
0.8706
Proposer RRDA + Voter . . .
CES 1.498
(0.017)
0.158
(0.001)
0.009
(0.005)
0
(NaN)
−0.252
(0.003)
−1.662
(0.007)
0.437
(0)
0.555
(0.003)
3748.12
−3718.2
0.8408
IneqAv 2.834
(0.002)
0.216
(0.001)
0.224
(0.001)
0.175
(0)
−0.204
(0.002)
−0.612
(0.002)
0.231
(0.001)
0
(0)
3835.47
−3805.17
0.8259
RRDA 3.039
(0)
0.187
(0.001)
0.159
(0.001)
0.135
(0.001)
−0.273
(0.003)
−0.678
(0.003)
−0.256
(0)
−0.504
(0)
3650.13
−3619.23
0.8562
ARDA 2.458
(0.001)
0.156
(0)
0.182
(0.002)
0.183
(0.001)
−0.164
(0.001)
−0.797
(0.005)
1.186
(0.008)
0.375
(0)
3605.1
−3574.81
0.8627
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λp ρ1 ρ2 λv αProp βProp αVot βVot IC L/LL/R
2
Proposer ARDA + Voter . . .
CES 2.165
(0.022)
0.088
(0)
0.002
(0.002)
−0.001
(NaN)
1.46
(0.01)
0.009
(0.001)
0.433
(0.003)
0.79
(0.002)
3750.57
−3725.76
0.8396
IneqAv 3.535
(0.013)
0.092
(0)
0.384
(0.002)
0.019
(0.001)
0.983
(0.004)
0.327
(0)
0.03
(0)
0.107
(0)
3910.23
−3879.94
0.812
RRDA 2.763
(0.009)
0.112
(0.002)
0.311
(0.003)
0
(0)
1.218
(0.01)
0.331
(0.002)
0.797
(0.003)
0.108
(0.001)
3784.21
−3753.92
0.8349
ARDA 3.814
(0.086)
0.097
(0.002)
0.235
(0.006)
0.12
(0.005)
0.919
(0.03)
0.284
(0.003)
1.985
(0.033)
0.4
(0)
3597.39
−3567.1
0.8638
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Table 9: Estimates for models with time-dependent parameters. All parameters x ∈ {λ,α,β} have an initial value and a time
dependency parameter κx ; the parameter value in game g is x+κx · g. The goodness-of-fit does not improve significantly
over the constant models, suggesting that parameters do not change significantly.
Type Share λp κp ρ1 ρ2 λv κv α κα β κβ IC L/LL/R
2
CES 1 1
(NaN)
8.614
(0.002)
−7.262
(0.064)
0.169
(0)
0.082
(0.001)
0.959
(0.004)
−0.373
(0.001)
0.248
(0.001)
0.339
(0.002)
0.91
(0)
0.028
(0)
3941.66
−3903.8
0.8074
IneqAv 1 1
(NaN)
4.235
(NaN)
−0.742
(NaN)
0.168
(NaN)
0.018
(NaN)
0.709
(NaN)
−0.467
(0.013)
0.001
(NaN)
−0.013
(NaN)
0.062
(NaN)
−0.014
(NaN)
3783.07
−3745.21
0.8364
RRDA 1 1
(NaN)
3.163
(0.003)
−0.483
(0)
0.194
(0)
0.118
(0)
0.057
(0)
0.053
(0)
−0.379
(0)
−0.087
(0)
−0.899
(0)
−0.068
(0)
3672.26
−3634.39
0.854
ARDA 1 1
(NaN)
4.045
(0.005)
−1.087
(0.005)
0.109
(0)
0.19
(0.001)
0.204
(0)
−0.058
(0)
0.948
(0.003)
0.041
(0)
0.37
(0)
0.01
(0)
3632.64
−3594.77
0.8598
CES +
IneqAv
1 0.314
(NaN)
32.426
(0.008)
0.025
(0.001)
0.354
(0)
0.617
(0)
13.038
(0.001)
−0.022
(0)
0.667
(0)
−0.004
(0.001)
0.874
(0)
0.11
(0)
2 0.686
(0.047)
6.091
(0.059)
0.027
(0.003)
0.148
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.414
(0.005)
0.015
(0.002)
0.014
(0.001)
−0.028
(0.002)
0.066
(0.001)
0.011
(0.001)
3685.83
−3590.88
0.8604
RRDA
+
ARDA
1 0.528
(NaN)
5.443
(0.022)
−0.002
(0.001)
0.133
(0)
0.103
(0.001)
0
(0.001)
−0.006
(0)
−0.268
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
−1.004
(0)
−0.001
(0.001)
2 0.472
(0.054)
3.235
(0.01)
0.031
(0.001)
0.12
(0.001)
0.049
(0.001)
0.307
(0.003)
0.301
(0.001)
0.789
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.001)
0.338
(0)
−0.004
(0)
3432.46
−3335.6
0.8926
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